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Abstract 
Under the golden rule of public finance for public investment with a constant budget 
deficit/GDP ratio, we show that for the sustainability of government budget deficits 
there is a threshold of the initial public debt for a given stock of public capital, and that 
this threshold level of public debt is increasing in the stock of public capital.  If the 
initial public debt is greater than the threshold, the government can no longer sustain 
budget deficits, while if it is smaller, the government can conduct a permanent deficit 
policy, which eventually leads to a positive public debt/GDP ratio.  
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1. Introduction  
     Since the outstanding work by Arrow and Kurz (1970), many authors have 
investigated the effects of public capital formation on the performance of the economy 
and the optimal fiscal policy in dynamic general equilibrium models. 1   In an 
endogenous growth setting, Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993), among others, 
analyzed the growth-maximizing public investment size (the public investment/GDP 
ratio) assuming public capital formation rather than public flow expenditures of Barro 
(1990) type.  In these theoretical contributions, however, they assumed that the 
government runs a balanced budget at any moment in time.  Nonetheless, recently, an 
intensive debate has arisen regarding the long-term growth effects of public investment 
financed under various versions of the so-called golden rule of public finance (e.g. 
Greiner and Semmler, 2000; Ghosh and Mourmouras, 2004).2  The golden rule of public 
finance is considered the fiscal rule according to which government expenditures for 
public consumption, transfer payments and interest payments must be smaller than the 
tax revenue.  Under the rule, borrowing is allowed to finance only government 
investment.   
     Greiner and Semmler (2000) showed that the long-term growth effects of public 
capital depend on the exact budgetary regime adopted by the government, and that a 
less strict budgetary regime may not lead to a positive growth effect of a deficit-financed 
government investment.  By comparing the welfare effects of allowing public 
borrowing under the standard dynamic government budget constraint and under the 
golden rule of public finance, Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004) showed that the golden 
rule of public finance can be an effective restriction on the composition of government 
                                                  
1 Empirically, Aschauer (1989) and Iwamoto (1990) among others showed the 
substantially great growth-enhancing effects of public capital.  However, Evans and 
Karras (1994) and Holtz-Eakin (1994) cast doubts on the empirical results. 
2 Among OECD countries, Japan has more than doubled its government debt/GDP ratio 
in the 1990s by raising the deficit finance ratio in the budget (0.9% in 1991, 6.6% in 
1995 and 8.3% in 1999), and the growth rate declined drastically from the 1970s to the 
1990s.  The government debt/GDP ratio of Japan was 64.8% in 1991 and became 
142.3% in 2001, the highest among OECD countries (OECD, 2004).  
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expenditure and that a less strict budgetary stance may lead to a lowering of welfare.  
     Under budget deficit policies, public debt accumulates and in turn affects the 
government budget.  While Greiner and Semmler (2000) and Ghosh and Mourmouras 
(2004) did not focus their attention on accumulation of public debt, the sustainability of 
public debt has been examined, for example, by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Bohn 
(1998).  Among others, pointing out that the transversality condition tests depend on 
sensitivity on the choice of discount rates and the cointegration tests generally do not 
adjust real levels of fiscal variables, Bohn (1998) proposed a new test that requires that 
primary surplus increases at least linearly with the ratio of debt to GDP at high 
debt-GDP ratios.  In contrast, Chalk (2000) examined the sustainability of government 
budget deficits in an overlapping generations model of Diamond (1965) type, and 
showed that the present value budget balance may not be crucial to the sustainability of 
permanent deficits.   
     While it is well known that permanent budget deficits can be sustainable when the 
dynamic resource allocation is dynamically inefficient in an overlapping generations 
setting (e.g. Diamond, 1965; Tirole, 1985), Chalk (2000) also showed that, even when 
the growth rate is lower than the interest rate and hence the cost of debt finance is high, 
the government can run the primary deficits, and that the permanent deficits are 
sustainable only when the initial public debt is not too large.  Bräuninger (2005) 
showed in an overlapping generations model with the AK production structure that 
under a fiscal rule in which the government purchase/GDP ratio and the budget 
deficit/GDP ratio are constant, the tax rate therefore being endogenously adjusted, 
there is a stable steady-growth path as long as the initial debt-capital ratio is lower 
than a certain level, and that an increase in the deficit rate reduces the growth rate.  
However, both Chalk (2000) and Bräuninger (2005), as well as most of the literature on 
public debt sustainability, assumed that government expenditures are public 
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consumption.3  
     Our purpose in this study is to analyze the sustainability of budget deficits, 
simultaneously taking into account the growth effects of a deficit-financed public 
investment, in an endogenous growth setting with the growth engine of public capital 
formation.  For our purpose, we use the overlapping generations model pioneered by 
Diamond (1965), in which public debt can have real effects.  We assume that the 
government not only controls the public investment/GDP ratio but also keeps the deficit 
finance ratio in public investment at less than one.  Thus, the financing rule in this 
study is the mixture of the golden rule of public finance, as to the borrowing rule, and a 
deficit rule of keeping the budget deficits at a certain percentage of GDP, while the tax 
rate must be endogenously adjusted according to the government budget constraint.4  
The public debt/GDP ratio is endogenously determined by the fiscal rule along the 
growth path.   
     We illustrate that there can be two long-term equilibria, one locally stable and one 
saddle-point stable, and that there is a threshold for the initial public debt in order for 
budget deficits to be sustainable at each level of public capital stock.  The threshold of 
the initial public debt is represented by a point on the stable branch to the saddle-point 
equilibrium, and is increasing in the stock of public capital, i.e. the so-called public 
assets.  If the initial public debt is greater than the threshold at a level of public capital, 
the government can no longer sustain the fiscal deficit policy.  If the initial debt is 
smaller than the threshold, the economy converges to the stable equilibrium and the 
government can run the permanent fiscal deficit and public investment policy, which 
eventually leads to a positive public debt/GDP ratio.  We also show that decreases in 
the public investment/GDP ratio and/or the deficit finance ratio will raise the threshold 
for a given level of public capital stock, and that the decreased deficit finance ratio leads 
                                                  
3 Greiner (2006) examined the sustainability and the growth effects of public 
investment in a dynamic model, incorporating the fiscal rule proposed by Bohn (1998) 
into a representative, infinitely-lived agent model of Futagami et al. (1993) type.   
4 Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004) classified fiscal rules into four types; (i) balanced 
budget rules, (ii) deficit rules, (iii) borrowing rules, and (iv) debt/reserve rules.    
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to higher balanced growth, while an increase in the public investment ratio can have a 
growth-enhancing effect.   
     The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  We devote the next section to 
developing an overlapping generations model of Diamond (1965) type, which 
incorporates public capital formation.  Section 3 analyzes dynamics of the economy and 
the long-term equilibrium.  The effects of policy changes are analyzed in Section 4, 
while the last section presents concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. Model   
     We consider a one-sector endogenous growth model, populated by two-period-lived 
generations and with accumulation of public capital as the growth engine.  Assuming 
that the population of each generation in the economy is constant over time, we denote 
it as N .   
 
2.1 Production 
Production technology of a representative firm j  is assumed to be  
 αα −= 1)()(~ jjj GLKAY  ( 0~;10 ><< Aα )   (1) 
where jY , jK  and jL  stand for output, private capital stock and labor, respectively, 
employed by the firm.  G  is the stock of public capital which is available and common 
for all firms.  We assume here that public capital stock enters the production function, 
as in Futagami et al. (1993), and that the use of capital is not subject to congestion.  
Denoting the interest rate and the wage rate as r  and w , respectively, the profit 
maximizing conditions of the firm in competitive markets are given as 
 rKYKY jjjj ==∂∂ )/(/ α ,     (2a) 
 wLYLY jjjj =−=∂∂ )/)(1(/ α .     (2b) 
 
2.2 Individuals  
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A representative individual works only when young, and the labor supply is inelastic 
and normalized to one.  He consumes a part of wage income and saves the remainder 
for his retirement during the second period.  The lifetime budget constraint of the 
individual can be written as  
 
11
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where yc  and oc 1+  are consumption in the first and second period, respectively; τ  
stands for the income tax rate; and the variable with subscript 1+  represents the 
value of the variable in the next period.  We assume here perfect foresights of 
individuals for the future after-tax rate of return on savings.   
     Individuals are assumed to derive their utility only from their own consumption 
and have no bequest motives.  The utility function is oy ccU 1lnln)1( ++−= δδ , 
where 10 << δ .  An individual chooses consumption allocation so as to maximize the 
lifetime utility subject to the lifetime budget constraint (3).  The optimizing conditions 
give the savings of the individual ycws −−≡ )1( τ  as 
 ws )1( τδ −= .       (4) 
 
2.3 Government  
The government budget consists of two components, current budget and capital budget. 
Abstracting from government consumption and transfer payments, and defining ϕ  as 
the proportion of tax revenue to finance the current spending of interest payments on 
public debt, we have the current budget as TrD ϕ= where NrswT )( 1−+= τ  is 
income tax revenue and D  stands for the outstanding stock of public debt in the 
economy, while the capital component of the government budget is 
TDDGG )1(11 ϕ−+−=− ++ , that is, public investment is financed partly by public 
bond issues and partly by income tax revenue.  Thus, the integrated budget equation of 
the government is given as 
 rDGGNrswDD +−=++− +−+ )()()( 111 τ .   (5) 
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     We assume here that the government invests a constant fraction of GDP, θ , in 
public capital and finances a proportion, λ , of the expenditure by issuing bonds, where 
1,0 << λθ , i.e.  
 YGG θ=−+1 ,       (6) 
 )( 11 GGDD −=− ++ λ ][ Yλθ=      (7) 
where ∑=
j
jYY .5  As long as 10 << λ , on the one hand, we have from (5), (6) and 
(7) 
 0)()( 11 <−=−−− ++ TrDGGDD     (8) 
The tax revenue is greater than interest payments on the outstanding debt, in other 
words, the portion of the tax revenue spent on current expenditure is less than one, 
10 << ϕ .  On the other hand, inserting (6) and (7) into (5), the budget equation 
becomes rDYY )1()1( τλθτ −+−= .  When θ  and λ  are kept constant, the 
government must adjust the tax rate τ  in order to satisfy the budget equation (5).6  
Thus, the fiscal policy, represented by ),( λθ  in (6) and (7), is the mixture of the regime 
(A) of the golden rule of public finance in Greiner and Semmler (2000: p 368) and the 
deficit rule in Bräuninger (2005).   
 
2.4 Market equilibrium  
Because of the linear homogeneity of the production function of each firm, the 
capital/(effective) labor ratio is the same for all firms, i.e. KGLKGL jj /)(/)( =  and 
hence KYKY jj // =  for all j , where ∑=
j
jKK  and ][ NLL
j
j == ∑ .  
Therefore, from (2), we have  
                                                  
5 The Maastricht Treaty constrains the general government financial deficit not to 
exceed 3% of GDP.  Buiter (2001) stated that by restricting the financing options for 
investment, the Treaty is likely to depress the volume of public capital formation.  
However, he did not take into account the growth-enhancing effect of public capital. 
6 Where ϕ  is endogenously given as ])(/[ 1 NrswrD −+= τϕ .  
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 )/()/( 1 KYKGAr αα α == − ,     (9a) 
 )/)(1()/()1( 1 LYKKGAw αα α −=−= − .    (9b) 
where α−= 1~LAA . 
     Since the assets which individuals can hold are only private capital and public 
bonds, and since only the working generations have the assets, the equilibrium 
condition in the capital market is  
 sNDK =+ ++ 11 .      (10) 
     Making use of individuals’ budget equations, distribution of outputs, government’s 
budget equation and the equilibrium condition in the capital market, the resource 
constraint in the period is given as7  
 )()( 11 KKGGNcNcY
oy −+−++= ++ .    (11) 
Output is allocated among consumption of the two generations, private investment and 
public investment.   
 
 
3. Dynamics and long-term equilibrium    
     Now we have a look at the dynamics of the economy.  From (6), we have the 
evolution of public debt as  
 )/(11 DY
D
D λθ+=+ .      (12) 
Since the tax rate, τ , is set so as to satisfy the budget equation (7), and by inserting (5), 
(6) and (9) into (7), making use of the linearity of the aggregate production function and 
rearranging terms, we obtain  
 
)/(1
)1(11
KDα
λθτ +
−−=− .      (13) 
                                                  
7 The inter-period budget constraints of the two generations, scw y +=− )1( τ  and 
ocNDKr =+−+ ]/)][()1(1[ τ , are used. 
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Inserting s  from (5), w  from (9b), τ−1  from (13) and D  from (7) into the condition 
(10), dividing both sides by K , and using the production function, we obtain the rate of 
change in private capital stock as 
 )/()/(])1(
)/(1
)1(1[ 11 KDKGA
KDK
K −−−+
−−= −+ αλθαδα
λθ .  (14) 
For our purpose we assume 0/1 >+ KK  in the following.  The evolution of public 
capital is obtained, from (5), as 
 )/(11 GY
G
G θ+=+ .      (15) 
     The dynamics of the system can be represented by the three difference equations 
(12), (14) and (15), in private capital stock,K , public capital stock, G , and the stock of 
public debt, D , which are the state variables.   
     The balanced growth path is defined as a path on which the three state variables 
grow at the same rate, and the balanced growth rate is defined as  
 γ+≡== +++ 1111
D
D
G
G
K
K .     (16) 
Defining new variables KGg /≡  and KDx /≡  as in the literature of endogenous 
growth, we can rewrite the dynamic system as the following two difference equations in 
terms of x  and g : from (14) and (15),  
 
xAg
x
Ag
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g
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−−
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−
−+++
α
α
λθαδα
λθ
θ
1
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])1(
1
)1(1[
1/   (17) 
and, from (12) and (14), 
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+==
−
−+++
α
α
λθαδα
λθ
λθ
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1
111
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)1(1[
)/(1/ .  (18) 
On the balanced growth path, therefore, we have 
1/1 =+ gg ,       (19a) 
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1/1 =+ xx        (19b) 
which give the steady state ( xg, ) as a solution to the dynamic system.  From (17), (18) 
and (19), we can readily see that there exists such a steady state satisfying  
 xg =λ         (20) 
as long as both conditions of (19) are satisfied.   
 
3.1 Critical levels of public investment ratio and debt finance ratio  
At this stage, we briefly examine the sustainability condition on government budget 
policy represented by the public investment ratio and the debt finance ratio, ),( λθ .  
We assume that the initial outstanding debt is positive ( 0>D ), and that the debt 
finance ratio is changed to 0=λ , while a positive public investment is still undertaken 
at a positive ratio to output )0(0 >θ .  The income tax rate is determined so as to 
finance both public investment and interest payments on the outstanding debts for the 
historically given public capital/private capital ratio and the public debt/private capital 
ratio, ),( xg .  In this case, we have 1/1 =+ DD , while 1/1 >+ KK  if the economy 
grows due to public investment.  Therefore, the public debt/private capital ratio will be 
lower in the next period, i.e. 1/1 <+ xx .  Alternatively, if debt finance is allowed 
instead of the balanced budget, that is, if we have 0>λ  instead, the public 
debt/private capital in the next period becomes greater than that obtained when 0=λ , 
since we can show 0/)/( 1 >+ λdxxd  from (18); and for the same public capital/private 
capital ratio and public debt/private capital ratio ),( xg , the greater the public 
debt/private capital in the next period, the greater the debt finance ratio.  Thus, we 
have the minimum public debt ratio 00 >λ  such that 1/1 ≥+ xx  holds for the public 
investment ratio, 0θ .  Since 0/)/( 1 >+ θdxxd , the debt finance ratio 1λ  which 
makes 1/1 ≥+ xx  is smaller for a higher public investment ratio )( 01 θθ > , i.e. 
01 λλ < .  In other words, in order to satisfy 1/1 <+ xx  for a given ),( xg , the higher 
the public investment ratio, the lower the debt finance ratio.  In a similar way, from 
0/)/( 1 >+ λdggd  and 0/)/( 1 >+ θdggd  we can see that in order to satisfy 
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1/1 <+ gg  for a given ),( xg , the higher the public investment ratio, the lower the 
debt finance ratio.  Thus, given the state variables ),( xg , we can find the minimum 
debt finance ratio such that either 1/1 ≥+ gg  or 1/1 ≥+ xx  holds for a given public 
investment ratio.  
     From the above consideration, we can say that a fiscal policy represented by a 
combination ),( λθ , that makes either 1/1 ≥+ gg  or 1/1 ≥+ xx  for any ),( xg , is not 
sustainable in the sense that a balanced growth path of the economy may not exist.  
The government must decrease either the public investment ratio or the debt finance 
ratio, or both, in order to prevent the economy from diverging from the path of balanced 
growth.  It should be noted that a decrease in the public investment ratio means a 
decrease in the public deficits/GDP ratio.   
     While the conventional literature on sustainability of public deficits without public 
capital accumulation (e.g. Chalk, 2000; Bräuninger, 2005) emphasized a critical level of 
government budget deficits, our analysis with public investment shows the existence of 
the critical budget rule ),( λθ  for the sustainability of budget deficits, although we can 
not express the policy explicitly in terms of budget deficits.  Especially, as will be 
shown later, even if we have 1/1 ≥+ xx  or 1/1 ≥+ gg  in the transition converging to 
the long-term equilibrium, the fiscal policy ),( λθ  can be sustainable.  Since we are 
rather concerned here with the sustainability of the budget deficits in relation to the 
(initial) public debt, we focus our attention on the cases in which both conditions of (19) 
hold.   
 
3.2 Initial conditions for sustainability  
Now we analyze the properties of the balanced growth paths.  First, we derive the 
combinations ( xg, ) which satisfy (19a).  (19a) is rewritten as   
 αα λθαδα
λθθ −− −−+
−−=++ 1])1(
1
)1(1[1 Ag
x
xAg .   (21) 
Let the left and right hand side of (21) be ),( xgβ  and ),( xgε , respectively.  Fig. 1 
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illustrates the two functions for a given value of the public capital/private capital ratio, 
g .  There is a crossing of β  and ε , and the value of x  which satisfies (19a) or (21) 
for the given g  is indicated by the vertical arrow.   
 
[Please insert Fig. 1 about here] 
 
     An increase in g  shifts the function β  downward and ε  rightward in the 
positive quadrant, respectively, and therefore raises x  correspondingly.  These shifts 
are depicted by the dotted lines in Fig. 1.  Thus, the combination ( xg, ) satisfying (19a) 
can be depicted as an upward-sloping curve, GG , on the ( xg, ) plane in Fig. 3.  
Denoting the slope of the curve GG  as GGdxdg / , we can see 
 0
])1(
1
)1(1[)1(
1)1(
)1(
)1(1
1
2
1
>
+−−+
−−−
+−+
−−
=
−−−
−
αα
α
αθλθαδα
λθα
ααδα
λθ
Ag
x
Ag
x
Ag
dx
dg
GG . (22) 
Since the right hand side of (21) must be positive, x has an upper limit, 
)/(})1()]1(1{[ αλθλθαδλθ −−−−=x , and since x  is non-negative, g  has a lower 
limit g  when 0=x , where g  satisfies 
αα λθαδλθθ −− −−−−=+ 1})1()]1(1{[1 gAgA .   
     Next, turning to (19b) and rewriting it, we have 
 α
α
λθαδα
λθλθ −
−
−−+
−−=++ 1
1
])1(
1
)1(1[1 Ag
x
x
x
gA .  (23) 
Let the left hand side of (23) be ),( xgη , while the right hand side is the same as in (21), 
i.e. ),( xgε .  Fig. 2 illustrates the two functions, η  and ε , for a given value of g .  
There are two intersections of the two functions, which give two values of x  which 
satisfy (23) for the given g , calling the smaller one type (i) and the greater one type (ii).  
We can see that an increase in g  shifts both ),( xgε  and ),( xgη  upward, and that 
the upward shift of ),( xgε  is greater than that of ),( xgη  at each value of x .  
These shifts are illustrated by the dotted lines in Fig. 2.  Therefore, an increase in g  
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lowers x  of type (i) and raises x  of type (ii), respectively.  Plotting the combinations 
of ( xg, ) satisfying (19b) and (23) on the ( xg, ) plane, we have a curve, XX , which is 
U-shaped as depicted in Fig. 3.  Denoting the slope of the curve XX  as XXdxdg /  
and from (19b), we obtain the following:  
 
}])1(
1
)1(1{[)1(
1])1(
)1(
)1(1[ 122
xx
Ag
Ag
xx
dx
dg
XX λθλθαδα
λθα
λθααδα
λθ
α
α
−−−+
−−−
+−−+
−−
=
−
−
  (24) 
where the denominator of the right hand side is positive from (23) and 0>x .  At x  of 
type (i), we have xx ∂∂>∂∂ // ηε , i.e.  
 01])1(
)1(
)1(1[ 122 <+−−+
−− −αλθααδα
λθ Ag
xx
   (25) 
and at type (ii), xx ∂∂<∂∂ // ηε , i.e.   
 01])1(
)1(
)1(1[ 122 >+−−+
−− −αλθααδα
λθ Ag
xx
   (26) 
 
[Please insert Fig. 2 about here] 
 
Therefore, we can see that 0/ <XXdxdg  at type (i) and 0/ >XXdxdg  at type (ii).  
As g  approaches zero, ),( xgη  comes closer to the line x+1  and ),( xgε  to the 
horizontal axis, respectively.  In order for a positive x  satisfying (23) to exist, there is 
a lower limit of g , g .  Since the intercept of ),( xgε  on the vertical line must be 
greater than 1, g  satisfies αλθαδλθ −−−−−< 1)(})1()]1(1{[1 gA .  
     Now we can analyze the balanced growth paths, represented by the steady states 
( xg, ) satisfying (19a) and (19b) simultaneously.  The steady state values of ( xg, ) are 
illustrated by the crossings of the curves, XX  and GG , on the ( xg, ) plane in Fig. 3.  
Since (19) is not linear in g  and x , we will generally have two long-term equilibria, 
which are illustrated by the intersections of the curves GG  and XX  in Fig. 3 as S  
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at low x  and U  at high x .  The curve XX  has a negative slope at equilibrium S  
and a positive slope at equilibrium U .  When both conditions of (19) hold, we have 
(20), and therefore the equilibria are on the line (20).8  A phase diagram is drawn in Fig. 
3 by using (17) and (18) (see Appendix A).  The diagram shows that equilibrium S  is 
locally stable and equilibrium U  is saddle-point stable, respectively (for the proof, see 
Appendix B).  The stable branches converging to the saddle point are illustrated by a 
dotted line in Fig. 3.   
 
[Please insert Fig. 3 about here] 
 
     Since K , G  and D  are predetermined variables, the initial state of the 
economy is given by a point ( 00 , xg ) on the ( xg, ) plane, where 0g  and 0x  are the 
initial values of the public capital/private capital ratio and the public debt/private 
capital ratio.  We have three cases: (i) If the initial state ( 00 , xg ) locates on the 
lower-right of the saddle-point stable branch, the economy will not have long-term 
equilibrium; (ii) if the initial point ( 00 , xg ) is on the stable branch, the economy 
converges to the equilibrium U ; and (iii) if it is on the upper-left of the stable branch, 
the economy eventually converges to the stable equilibrium S .   
     It should be noted at this stage that we confine ourselves to cases in which 
0])1(
1
)1(1[ 1 >−−−+
−− − xAg
x
αλθαδα
λθ , or equivalently 0/1 >+ KK , so that 
0/1 >+ gg  and 0/1 >+ xx .  If this condition is not satisfied, both the public 
capital/private capital ratio and the public debt/private capital may go to zero in infinite 
time, as can be seen from (17) and (18).  The combinations of ( xg, ) satisfying 
                                                  
8 We can not rule out the possibility that there is only one long-term equilibrium, at 
which the curve XX  is tangent to the curve GG .  In this case, there is a stable arm 
to the equilibrium only above the curve XX , while the long-term equilibrium is still on 
the line (20).  It should be noted, however, that as long as conditions (19) are satisfied, 
we have at least one equilibrium.    
 15
0])1(
1
)1(1[ 1 =−−−+
−− − xAg
x
αλθαδα
λθ  are plotted as the broken curve, BB , in Fig. 
3.9  From (21) and (23) we can easily see that the curves XX  and GG  are above the 
curve BB .   
     The above result has important implications for the sustainability of budget deficit 
and public debt.  When conditions (19) are satisfied, the economy converges to the 
stable balanced-growth equilibrium insofar as the initial public debt/private capital 
ratio is not too large relative to the public capital/private capital ratio.  In other words, 
there is a threshold of initial public debt for a given stock of public capital stock.  At the 
balanced-growth equilibrium, the stocks of public and private capital and public debt 
grow at the same rate, αθγ −= Ag , which is greater than, equal to, or smaller than, the 
interest rate αα −= 1Agr , depending on whether g  is smaller than, equal to, or 
greater than, αθ / .  Interest on the public debt can be paid forever, although the 
public debt may not be paid off in the future, and the government can run the fiscal 
deficit and public investment policy permanently.  In this sense the fiscal deficit is 
sustainable, and the fiscal policy ),( λθ  leads to the permanent, constant and positive, 
public debt/private capital ratio.  It should be recalled here that the cost of debt finance 
is the after-tax interest rate.  
     The transitional path to the stable equilibrium is as follows.  When the initial 
public debt/private capital ratio, x , is great but less than the threshold, the tax rate 
will be relatively low.  Therefore, private savings and hence private capital formation, 
relative to GDP, will be greater, lowering the public debt/private capital ratio along the 
transitional path.  If in addition the initial public capital/private capital ratio is 
relatively high, the wage rate is higher, and so is the private savings for a given tax rate.  
High private savings reinforce private capital formation, lowering both the public 
capital/private capital ratio and the public debt/private capital ratio.      
                                                  
9 Increases in θ  and/or λ  shift the curve BB  to the upper-left, although it passes 
through the origin. 
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     In contrast, if the initial public debt is greater than the threshold, the budget rule, 
( λθ , ), requires the government to revise the budget policy.  The government 
borrowings hinder private capital formation, raising the marginal productivity of 
private capital, i.e. the interest rate.  A greater amount of debt service requires the 
government to raise the income tax rate, thereby decelerating private capital formation.  
Since the size of public deficits is a constant fraction of GDP, the public debt/private 
capital ratio, and hence the tax rate, will be greater and greater.  The growth rate of 
private capital becomes non-positive as the public debt/private capital ratio approaches 
the upper limit, x .  Therefore, the fiscal policy is not sustainable.10  The government 
must change the fiscal policy to reduce budget deficits.  This policy change will be 
examined in the next section.    
     If the initial point is on the stable branch, the economy goes into the saddle-point 
equilibrium, U .  The growth rate at equilibrium U  may not necessarily be lower 
than the growth rate at equilibrium S , while the public debt/private capital ratio and 
the public capital/private capital ratio at U are higher than those at S .  However, as 
will be shown in the next section, the government can lower the public debt/GDP ratio 
and raise the growth rate by increasing the deficit finance ratio, λ , at equilibrium U .  
Therefore, at equilibrium U , the government may have an incentive to increase the 
deficit finance ratio, and in this case the fiscal deficit policy could not be sustained by 
the government.11   
     Thus, we have the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1 
                                                  
10 In our setting with the tax rate endogenously determined, the primary surplus/GDP 
ratio is given as )1/(])1([ xx αλθθαθτ +−−=− .  Since we can see that the 
primary surplus/GDP ratio increases with the debt/GDP ratio, i.e. 0/)( >− dxd θτ , a 
sufficient condition for the sustainability, which is suggested by Bohn (1998), is satisfied 
even in this case.   
11 Once the deficit finance ratio or the public investment ratio is increased, the fiscal 
policy becomes unsustainable.  
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Under a public investment and fiscal deficit policy, parameterized by ),( λθ , there is a 
threshold of public debt for each level of public capital in order for government to 
sustain the fiscal policy.  The threshold of public debt is increasing in public capital 
stock. 
 
     It should be noted that the threshold of public debt, i.e. the constraint on the 
sustainability of budget deficits, is given in relation to the level of public, rather than 
private, capital, and that the threshold of public debt is greater as the stock of public 
capital becomes greater.  This is in contrast to the sustainability literature without 
public capital accumulation, which shows the critical size of the initial public debt as a 
sustainability condition on the level of public debt in relation to a given initial private 
capital stock (e.g. Chalk, 2000; Bräuninger, 2005).  If the economy has accumulated a 
greater stock of public capital in the past, it will be able to sustain a greater stock of 
public debt.12  In our model with the growth engine of public capital accumulation, the 
government can run budget deficits even with a great stock of outstanding debt as long 
as sufficient public capital has been accumulated in the past.  It is well known that the 
public investment/GDP ratio of Japan has been higher than those of other developed 
countries over the past several decades.  Assuming that the higher investment is 
reflected in a greater stock of public capital, the budget deficits may be sustainable for 
an even relatively greater public debt.13  Fukuda and Teruyama (1994) among others 
                                                  
12 Buiter (2001) pointed out that a prudent level of the debt-GDP ratio depends on 
many structural features of the economy, and noted that a one-size-fits-all figure, such 
as the 60% ceiling of the Maastricht Treaty, makes no sense at all.  Our result confirms 
his statement in a growth context. 
13 We here abstract from the efficiency problem of public investment.  For example, in 
Japan the structure of Public Works has changed only slightly, i.e. most items changed 
no more than 2% points, over two decades (1980-1999), while the relative shares of 
primary, secondary and tertiary industries have changed from (3.6, 37.8, 58.7) to (1.7, 
31.7, 66.7) respectively.  Many authors in Japan (e.g. Doi and Nakazato, 2004) cast 
doubt on the productive efficiency.  Yakita (2004) showed that when the elasticity of 
substitution in public investment is small, an increase in the income-tax-financed public 
investment ratio to GDP may result in a lower balanced growth rate even below the 
government size of the natural efficiency condition. 
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examined the sustainability of public debt in postwar Japan (for the period 1965-1992), 
based on the transversality condition test and the modified cointegration test, and 
concluded that it was sustainable.  In contrast, Doi and Nakazato (2004) recently 
found that public debt is not sustainable, based on Bohn’s (1998) test and using the data 
of the period 1955-2000.  However, none of the above investigators considered the 
productivity effects of public expenditure explicitly.  Our result shows that the 
sustainability of public debts must be considered by taking into account the relative 
magnitude of the stock of public capital.  
 
 
4. Analysis of policy effects   
     We analyze the effects of changes in the public investment/GDP ratio and in the 
ratio of public bond financing.14    
 
4.1 Changes in public investment/GDP ratio 
While an increase in the public investment/GDP ratio, θ , shifts upward both curves 
GG  and XX , we can see that the upward shift of the curve XX  is greater than that 
of the curve GG  (see Appendix C).  Since changes in x  and g  satisfy equation (20), 
the stable equilibrium S  shifts up-and-rightward and the saddle-point equilibrium U  
shifts left-and-downward.  An increase in the public investment/GDP ratio raises both 
the (stable) long-term public capital/private capital ratio and public debt/private capital 
ratio.  In contrast, the saddle-point equilibrium moves left-and-downward, and, at 
least in the vicinity of the equilibrium, the stable branch also shifts left-and-downward.  
Therefore, the threshold of public debt for a given value of public capital stock becomes 
lower, which implies that the range in which the deficit policy is not sustainable is 
widened by the increased public investment/GDP ratio.  The economy lying initially 
near the saddle-point equilibrium becomes unable to sustain the public debt in the 
                                                  
14 The comparative statics make sense only for the stable long-term equilibrium. 
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sense that an increase in the public investment ratio enhances the instability of the 
economic system.  Conversely, a decrease in the public investment ratio enhances the 
stability of the system in the sense that it may lead the economy to the stable long-term 
equilibrium when it was initially near, but on the lower-right of, the saddle-point 
equilibrium and with unsustainable (initial) public debt.   
     Since the public debt/GDP ratio can be written as 
11)/)(/(/ −−== αgxAYKKDYD , we have  
 ])1([)( 211 θαθθ
αα
d
dgxg
d
dxgA
Y
D
d
d −−− −+= .   (27) 
From (23) we can see ]/sgn[]/)/(sgn[ θθ ddgdYDd = , since at the stable equilibrium, 
)/(/ θλθ ddgddx =  from (20).  Therefore, an increase (a decrease) in the public 
investment/GDP ratio raises (lowers) the public debt/GDP ratio of the long-term stable 
equilibrium.  Then we have the following proposition:15 
 
Proposition 2 
A decrease (an increase) in the public investment/GDP ratio, keeping the debt finance 
ratio constant, will not only lower (raise) the public debt/GDP ratio in the long term, but 
also raise (lower) the threshold of the public debt/public capital ratio, so that the range 
of sustainable (initial) public debt will be enlarged (shrunk) by the policy change. 
 
     The tax rate is obtained from (13) as 
 
x
x
α
αλθτ +
+−=
1
)1( .      (28) 
The effect of an increase in the public investment/GDP ratio is two-fold: a short-term 
(direct) effect due to the increase in the ratio and a long-term (indirect) effect through 
changes in the public debt/private capital ratio.  With an increase in the public 
capital/GDP ratio, both effects are obviously negative.  Since the debt finance ratio is 
                                                  
15 The public debt/public capital, gx / , does not change in the long term. 
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kept constant, the increased public investment ratio not only requires an increase in the 
tax rate at the instant of the policy change, but also increases bond issues.  The 
increased public debt in turn increases the interest payments to public debt, requiring a 
further increase in the tax rate.  A decrease in the public investment ratio brings about 
a tax cut both in the short and long term.    
 
Corollary 3  
A decrease (an increase) in the public investment/GDP ratio leads to tax cuts (increases) 
not only directly in the short term but also indirectly through decreases (increases) in 
the interest payments to public debt in the long term.   
 
4.2 Changes in public debt finance ratio 
A rise in the public debt finance ratio of public investment shifts both the curves GG  
and XX  upward.  Thus, the effects of a rise in the public debt finance ratio on public 
capital/private capital ratio and the public debt/private capital ratio are qualitatively 
similar to those of increases in the public investment/GDP ratio (see Appendix C).    
 
Proposition 4  
When the public investment/GDP ratio is kept constant, a decrease (an increase) in the 
public debt finance ratio of the public investment not only reduces (raises) the long-term 
public debt/private capital ratio, but also raises (lowers) the threshold of the initial 
public debt/public capital ratio so that the range of sustainable (initial) public debt will 
be enlarged (shrunk) by the policy change. 
 
     However, in contrast to the effect of an increase in the public investment/GDP 
ratio, the short-term effect of the increased public debt finance ratio on the tax rate is 
negative, since it reduces the ratio of tax finance at the moment of the policy change.  
The indirect effect through increases in the public debt/private capital ratio will, at least 
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partly, offset the negative effect, although the long-term tax rate may be lower, constant 
or higher than the rate before the policy change.16   
 
Corollary 5  
A decrease in the debt finance ratio brings about a tax increase (a cut) in the short term, 
although the indirect effect through changes in the public debt/private capital ratio at 
least partly offsets the tax increase (the tax cut).  The short-term effect may not be 
necessarily entirely offset by the long-term effect.  
 
4.3 Effects on the balanced growth rate  
From (14) the balanced growth rate is rewritten as  
 xAg
x
−−−+
−−=+ −αλθαδα
λθγ 1])1(
1
)1(1[1 .   (29) 
Making use of the fact that xg =λ  holds in the long-term equilibrium, and from (29), 
we have  
 ⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+
−−= −−− ]1)1(
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1 αα ααδα
λθλθ
γ Ag
x
AgH
d
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]})1(
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)1(1[)1( λθαδα
λθα α −−+
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x
Ag  
  ⎟⎠
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1
)1(1[22 λαδα
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and 
 ]}1)1(
)1(
)1(1[)
1
)1(1({ 12
1 +−+
−−++
−−= −−−− ααα ααδα
λθ
α
αδαθλ
γ Ag
xx
AgAgH
d
d  
         (31) 
where   
                                                  
16 An increase in λ  raises the balanced-growth public debt/public capital ratio and 
moves the line (20).  
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x
gAg  (32) 
(see Appendix D).  While the numerator of the right hand side of (31) is positive, we can 
see that the numerator of the right hand side of (30) is positive if H  is positive.  From 
(22) we can see that 0>H  when the curve GG  is steeper than the line λ/xg = , 
and that 0<H  when the line is steeper than the curve GG .  Thus, at a saddle-point 
equilibrium such as U  in Fig. 3, we obtain 0/ >θγ dd  and 0/ >λγ dd , that is, an 
increase in the public investment ratio per se boosts economic growth, making the 
interest rate higher due to debt finance, while an increase in the debt finance ratio 
reduces the tax finance ratio, stimulating private capital formation and thereby 
economic growth, but increasing interest payments at the same time.  However, the 
comparative statics at the saddle-point-stable equilibrium may not make sense.  In 
contrast, since the line λ/xg =  is steeper than the curve GG  at a stable equilibrium 
such as S  in Fig. 3, H  is negative.  Therefore, we can see that 0/ <λγ dd , that is, 
a cut in the public debt finance ratio, leads to higher growth since it stimulates private 
capital formation.  This result is consistent with that in Bräuninger (2005), who 
assumed away public capital accumulation.  However, the effect of an increase in the 
public investment/GDP ratio, θ , on the growth rate may be positive, zero, or negative.  
A rise in the public investment/GDP ratio affects economic growth negatively through 
corresponding increases in the tax rate per se and in the public debt/private capital 
ratio, whereas it has a positive effect on growth by raising the marginal productivity of 
private capital.  If the latter positive effect is sufficiently great, we can not exclude the 
possibility that the increased public investment ratio will raise the balanced growth 
rate.    
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5. Concluding remarks    
     In an endogenous growth model, populated by two-period-lived generations and 
with an engine of public capital formation, we have analyzed the sustainability of public 
debt policy, assuming that the public capital/GDP ratio and the public debt finance ratio 
of public investment are kept constant, and that the tax rate is adjusted so as to satisfy 
the government budget equation.  With Cobb-Douglas production function and the 
log-linear utility function, we have shown that there is a threshold for the initial stock 
of public debt at each level of public debt in order for the public investment and deficit 
policy to be sustainable, and that the threshold is increasing in the stock of public 
capital.  This contrasts with the condition of initial indebtedness of the economy given 
in the conventional literature without public investment in which the critical initial 
level of public debt is given in relation to private capital.  When public debt is greater 
than the threshold, the economy can no longer sustain the budget deficit and hence the 
balanced growth.  This implies that an economy which has accumulated only small 
public capital in the past may seriously diminish its set of feasible policy alternatives.   
     In our study with public capital formation, the sustainable fiscal policy is also 
conditioned by the public investment/GDP ratio and the debt finance ratio of public 
investment, rather than the size of government budget deficit itself.  Although the 
critical combination of the ratios can not be explicitly obtained, the result is also in 
contrast to the literature without public capital accumulation.    
     So far we have analyzed the sustainability of government deficit policy under the 
golden rule of public finance, assuming that the public investment ratio and the debt 
finance ratio are kept constant and that the tax rate is endogenously determined to 
satisfy the government budget.  The problems analyzed here are rather positive 
models in the sense that the fiscal policy may not necessarily be optimally arranged.  
In a representative, infinitely-lived agent model, Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004) 
showed that the optimal fiscal policy depends on the budgetary regime taken by 
government.  While many authors (e.g. Pestieau, 1974) examined the optimal public 
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capital formation and taxation policy in decentralized economies populated by 
overlapping generations in which public debt can have real effects, most of them did not 
take into account the restriction of the golden rule of public finance.  Analyzing the 
optimal policy under various fiscal regimes in such a setting is an interesting issue for 
future research. 
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Appendix A:  
From (18) we obtain the marginal effect of g  on xx /1+ , evaluated on the curve XX , 
as  
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Therefore, we have 1/1 <+ xx  above the curve XX  and 1/1 >+ xx  below the curve. 
From (17) we have the marginal effect of g  on gg /1+ , evaluated on the curve GG , 
as 
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Therefore, 1/1 <+ gg  on the left of the curve GG , and  1/1 >+ gg  on the right of 
the curve GG . 
 
Appendix B: 
Approximating (17) and (18) linearly in the neighborhood of the steady state, ( xg , ), we 
obtain 
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where 1/)/(/ 11 +∂∂⋅=∂∂ ++ gggggg , xgggxg ∂∂⋅=∂∂ ++ /)/(/ 11 , 
1/)/(/ 11 +∂∂⋅=∂∂ ++ xxxxxx  and gxxxgx ∂∂⋅=∂∂ ++ /)/(/ 11 , which are evaluated 
at the steady equilibrium.  The characteristic equation is 
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We can see 
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From (17) and (18) we can see 
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The discriminant of (A4) is  
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We can see that when 0/)/( 1 >∂∂ + xxx , the equation has real value solutions, while 
when 0/)/( 1 <∂∂ + xxx , the equation may have imaginary value solutions, as shown 
below.   
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)0(
)/(
)/(
)/(
)/(
1
1
1
1
>
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=>
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=
+
+
+
+
g
gg
x
gg
dx
dg
g
xx
x
xx
dx
dg
GGXX    (A12) 
at equilibrium U , where 01])1(
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(A6) that the characteristic equation has real value solutions and 0)1( <φ .  Therefore, 
we have 21 10 µµ <<<  where si 'µ  are the eigenvalues.  This implies the 
equilibrium is a saddle point.   
     On the other hand, at equilibrium S , where 
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Therefore, we obtain 0)1( >φ  from (A6) and )(2)1(' 11
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when the solutions are real values, we have 1,0 21 << µµ .  The equilibrium S  is 
locally stable and the system monotonically converges to equilibrium in its vicinity.  On 
the other hand, if we have imaginary value solutions, i.e. if the discriminant (A11) is 
negative, the system is oscillatory and converges to the steady equilibrium S  as long 
as (A5) is smaller than one.  Since the slope of the curve GG  is smaller then the line 
(20) at equilibrium S , we have  
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Making use of (18), (19) and (20), this condition becomes 
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Thus, together with (18) and (19), we can see that (A5) is smaller than one.   
     Therefore, whether the eigenvalues of the equation (A4) are real or imaginary, the 
equilibrium S  is locally stable.   
 
Appendix C: 
From (17) and (19a) we obtain  
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Therefore, the shifts of the curve GG  due to the policy changes are given as 
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Therefore, both changes in the public investment/GDP ratio and the public debt finance 
ratio shift the curve GG  upward.  Similarly, from (18) and (19b), we obtain 
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from which the shift of the curve XX  is given as   
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where the denominators on the right hand side of (A19) and (A20) are positive from 
(19b).  Thus, increases in the public investment/GDP ratio and the public debt finance 
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ratio shift the curve XX  upward.   
     Since the numerator of the right hand side of (A16) is the same as that of (A19), we 
have  
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. (A21) 
Similarly, from (A17) and (A20), we have   
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α
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. (A22) 
Therefore, both increases in the public investment/GDP ratio and the public debt 
finance ratio shift the curve XX  upward more than the curve GG .   
 
Appendix D: 
From (20) we have 
 dxdggd =+ λλ .       (A23) 
Making use of (A15) and (A23), we obtain 
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As noted in the text, since the curve GG  crosses the line (20) from the left-above to the 
right-below at the stable equilibrium S , we have 0<H  from (22).  However, since 
the curve GG  is steeper than the line (20) at the saddle-point-stable equilibrium U , 
we have 0>H .  Thus, we have 0/ >θddg  and 0/ >θddx  at the equilibrium S , 
and 0/ <θddg  and 0/ <θddx  at the equilibrium U .  Similarly, since  
 ⎟⎟⎠
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we have 0/ >λddg  and 0/ >λddx  at the equilibrium S , and 0/ <λddg  and 
0/ <λddx at the equilibrium U .   
     From (29) we obtain 
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         (A28) 
Inserting (A24) and (A25) into (A28), and rearranging terms, we have  
 ⎜⎝
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d  
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         (A29) 
When the curve GG  is steeper than the line (20) as at the equilibrium U , we have 
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In this case, 0>H , and the numerator of the right hand side of (A29) is positive.  
Therefore, we have 0/ >θγ dd .  However, even when 0<H , the numerator of the 
right hand side of (A29) can be negative.   
     From (29), we have  
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Inserting (A26) and (A27) into (A31), and rearranging terms, we have 
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         (A32) 
Since the numerator on the right hand side of (A32) is positive, we have 
)sgn()/sgn( Hdd =λγ .  Therefore, we have 0/ <λγ dd  at the stable equilibrium S  
where 0<H , and 0/ >λγ dd  at the saddle-point-stable equilibrium U  where 
0>H . 
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